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I. INTRODUCTION

Among the many lauded provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment stands out in the public eye as one of the more significant and
* The "jungle" seems a particularly apt metaphor for describing Fourth Amendment law,
see Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure?,20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 435, 437 (1997) (describing constitutional criminal procedure as a "fact-specific
jungle"), and for the often Hobbesian streets in which it operates. WILLIAM CHAMBLISS, POWER,
POLITICS, AND CRIME 68 (1999) (quoting an officer who states, "This is the jungle.., we rewrite
the Constitution every day down here").
** Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; J.D., Stanford Law School, 2002; B.A.,
University of California at Irvine, 1998. I would like to extend special thanks to Kerry C. O'Neill
for her valuable suggestions, Judge Robert J. Timlin for his generous mentoring and for inspiring
me to write this Article, and Professor Barbara Allen Babcock for encouraging exploration of the
Fourth Amendment's unsettled frontiers. The views expressed in this Article are my own.
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captivating of constitutional rights.' This is for good reason. The Fourth
Amendment functions in the gritty, front-line police encounters we all
experience either directly or vicariously though television or a newspaper's
local section.2 The various interests undergirding the Fourth Amendment,
such as privacy, liberty, the sanctity of the home, lay at the core of the
American ideal. The belief that we have not endowed the government with
unrestrained investigatory power by ratifying our liberalistic social contract
is resonant.' Indeed, it is a key characteristic separating us from the motley,
"less-developed" governments beyond our shores.4
Given the many important safeguards recognized by the Fourth
Amendment, few place much significance in one of its more recently
recognized components, the "knock and announce" rule. This rule requires
officers executing a search warrant to "knock and announce" their presence
before forcing entry into the home. It is understandable that the "knock and
announce" rule is overlooked among other constitutional rights considering
the venerable status of its more-established Fourth Amendment cousins.

1. Jonathan T. Skrmetti, The Keys to the Castle: A New Standardfor Warrantless Home
Searches in United States v. Knights, 122 S. Ct. 587 (2001), 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1201,
1201 (2002) (stating that "the technicalities of the Fourth Amendment have permeated popular
culture"); Wayne R. LaFave, The FourthAmendment as a "Big Time" TV Fad,53 HASTINGS L.J.
265 (2001) (discussing popularity of the Fourth Amendment in entertainment media); cf Akhil R.
Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994) ("In the popular
mind, the [Fourth] Amendment has lost its luster and become associated with grinning criminals
getting off on crummy technicalities.").
2. See LaFave, supranote 1, at 265 (stating that the popularity of Fourth Amendment drama
on television taught entertainment executives that "the success of any particular show.., would
depend, more than anything else, upon just how much Fourth Amendment gallimaufry could be
heaped upon acquiescent viewers' plates").
3. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized as much. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,
29 (1981) (stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause "restricts governmental power by restraining
arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation"); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354
(1974) ("The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions
into the privacy of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong condemned is the unjustified
governmental invasion of these areas of an individual's life."); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109,
135 (1972) (stating that First Amendment interests "have been thought so important as to provide
an independent restraint on every power of Government"); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371,377
(1958) ("Plainly enough the limitations arising from the manner in which the federal powers were
granted were limitations on the Federal Government, not on the States.").
4. Cf JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD, 1975-1995, at xxii
(1996) (stating that citizens in wealthier countries enjoy greater protection for civil rights than those
in poorer countries); Mary M. Shirley & Lixin Colin Xu, Empirical Effects of Performance
Contracts: Evidence from China, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 168, 170 (2001) ("[I]n developing
countries the institutions that curb arbitrary actions by governments and bind administrations to the
promises of their predecessors, such as checks and balances or reputation, are often weak.").
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One would be justified in expressing greater concern with whether police
officers possess probable cause and valid warrants or refrain from using
excessive force, than with whether officers courteously announce their
presence before entering a home. Especially where privacy, liberty, and
physical integrity are at stake, substance trumps form.
Yet, the "knock and announce" rule is by no means trivial. The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized in recent years that the "knock and
announce" rule is part of the common law tapestry that envelopes the U.S.
Constitution.' At its heart, the "knock and announce" rule stands for the
dignity ofthe individual: the ability to prepare your property and your mind
for governmental intrusion of the most invasive sort. It is supported by the
genteel ideal that even a criminal should be afforded the opportunity to
compose herself, open the castle door, and inspect the search warrant
before officers overrun the home. Such an opportunity only arises when
officers announce their presence and wait for the occupant of the home to
grant them entry.
Admittedly, the public perception of these dignity interests may be less
than sanguine in the "knock and announce" rule's common procedural
context, criminal suppression motions. A criminal defendant seeking to
suppress inculpatory evidence on the basis of officers' failure to call on the
occupant of the home in a mannerly fashion before conducting a search
garners little sympathy.6 The "knock and announce" rule appears more
significant, however, when the factual scenario changes to a case of
innocence, mistaken identity, or misinformation. Certainly, most
Americans would answer affirmatively if asked whether they should be
entitled to a respectful knock at the door by police officers seeking to enter
their home, even if the officers possess a valid search warrant.
Although the "knock and announce" rule provides important theoretical
safeguards to the occupant of a home, in practical terms, it is a largely
unenforceable constitutional right. In the criminal context, it is doubtful
that evidence can be suppressed for a pure "knock and announce" rule
violation. As for a civil action, various legal hurdles and limitations make
lodging a sustainable claim for breach of the "knock and announce" rule
an arduous proposition. This Article illustrates these enforcement problems

5. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
6. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("One hears the complaint, nowadays, that the Fourth Amendment has become constitutional law
for the guilty; that it benefits the career criminal (through the exclusionary rule) often and directly,
but the ordinary citizen remotely if at all."); Akhil Reed Amar, Three Cheers (And Two Quibbles)
for ProfessorKennedy, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1256, 1267 n.36 (1998) (stating that the exclusionary
rule "breeds popular contempt for the Fourth Amendment").
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through the lens of a non-English speaking home occupant. The Article
also considers a more banal problem: the futility of attempting to force
compensation for a door destroyed by officers.
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE "KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE" RULE

The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.7
The sanctity of the home is central to the Fourth Amendment. "At the
very core" of the personal rights secured by the Fourth Amendment "stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."8 The adage, "A man's home is his
castle,"9 resonates constitutionally." At common law, in Semayne's Case,
an English court observed "the house of every one is to him as his castle
and fortress, as well for his defense against injury and violence, as for his
repose."" More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he
ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not even the
king may enter' has lost none of its vitality."' 2 Based on this common law

7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
9. The popular coining of this phrase is often attributed to Clarence Darrow's closing
argument in the Henry Sweet case of 1926 in which Sweet, a black physician, was acquitted of
murdering a member of a mob gathered to forcibly expel him from an all-white neighborhood in
Detroit, Michigan. See Morris S. Dees, Jr., A Passionfor Justice, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 547,
549-51 (1995) (recounting the story of the Sweet case and Darrow's involvement in it). In his
closing argument, Darrow stated, "Every man's home is his castle, which even the King may not
enter. Every man has a right to kill to defend himself or his family, or others, either in the defense
of the home or in the defense of themselves." Closing Argument of Clarence Darrow in the Case
of People v. Henry Sweet, May 11, 1926, availableat http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
ftrials/sweet/darrowsummation.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
10. Darrow's words carried constitutional force. The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that "a man's home is his castle" in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66
(1973), and in Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
11. 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).
12. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
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inheritance, the Supreme Court has noted that the "Fourth Amendment
embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the
home.""3 The Court has gone so far as to say "physical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed."' 4 Thus, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution took pains to
protect the entryway to the home: "[T]he
Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm
5
line at the entrance to the house."",1
The "knock and announce" rule logically extends from this entrenched
legal reverence for the home. It requires officers to "knock and announce"
their presence before forcing their way into a home, even if they possess
a valid search warrant. It does so not merely by creating an idealistic rule
of police etiquette, but by elevating to constitutional dimension the
obligation that officers announce their presence when executing a search
warrant. For some time now, various jurisdictions have statutorily required
police officers to announce their presence in some manner before
executing a warrant.' 6 Yet the U.S. Supreme Court's precedential authority
recognizing the Fourth Amendment footing for the "knock and announce"
rule is of a vernal vintage.
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the "knock and announce"
rule as a component of the Fourth Amendment in Wilson v. Arkansas. 7
There, the Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court's determination
that the Constitution does not recognize the common law "knock and
announce" rule. The Court held that the "common-law 'knock and
announce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment."' 8 Surveying English law at the time of the U.S.
Constitution's drafting and ratification, the Court quoted Semayne 's Case,
stating that before the King's sheriff may break into an individual's home,
"he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open
doors" in order to avoid "the destruction or breaking of any house (which
is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and

13. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999).
14. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
15. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40(2001).
16. The "knock and announce" rule was first codified into federal law in 1917. See Act of
June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, §§ 8,9,40 Stat. 229 (providing specific requirements for officers who
forcibly enter houses to execute warrants or to "liberate" others detained in the process of executing
the warrant). The current federal "knock and announce" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which requires
an officer to provide "notice ofhis authority and purpose" before breaking into a home, was enacted
on June 25, 1948. See 62 Stat. 820.
17. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
18. Id. at 929.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 16

inconvenience might ensue."19 After an exhaustive discussion of early
common law and state cases, the Court opined, "we have little doubt that
the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an
officer's entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in
assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure."" ° At the same time,
the Court suggested that appropriate circumstances might warrant
dispensing the rule, but declined to delineate those circumstances. 2'
The Court wasted little time in expanding on the constitutional contours
of the "knock and announce" rule. In Richards v. Wisconsin,22 the Court
rejected the Wisconsin Supreme Court's blanket rule dispensing with the
"knock and announce" rule's requirements in felony drug cases. The Court
held the Wisconsin rule was an "overgeneralization" that "impermissibly
insulates [felony drug] cases from judicial review., 23 Although the Court
disapproved of the blanket exception, it opined that a "no-knock" entry
may be justified under exigent circumstances. Such exigent circumstances
arise if police "have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing
their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or
futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation
of the crime by,
24
for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.,
The Court was called upon to clarify this latter statement one year later
in UnitedStates v. Ramirez." On direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that
the police officers' "no-knock" entry of Ramirez's home violated the
Fourth Amendment because it was accomplished by destroying a window.
The appellate court concluded more specific inferences of exigency were
necessary to justify such destruction.26 The U.S. Supreme Court
disapproved of this approach. It held that reasonable suspicion alone is
sufficient to justify a "no-knock" entry, even when such entry results in
destruction of property. 27 "Whether such a 'reasonable suspicion' exists,"
the Court opined, "depends in no way on whether police must destroy
property in order to enter. "28 According to the Court, the reasonable
suspicion standard functioned adequately as the benchmark for all
determinations of exigency.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 931 (quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603)).
Id. at 934.
Id. at936.
520 U.S. 385 (1997).
Id. at 393.
Id. at 394.
523 U.S. 65 (1998).
United States v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1996).
Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 71.
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In its most recent "knock and announce" rule decision, the Court in
UnitedStates v. Banks2 9 addressed the question of what standards apply in
determining how long officers executing a valid search warrant must wait
before forcing their way into a home after knocking and announcing their
presence. The Ninth Circuit established a categorical approach to this
question, involving consideration of whether a preexisting exigency was
present and whether entry was possible without employing force. 3" The
Court disagreed with this categorical approach. Instead, the Court held that
the determination of whether officers waited an adequate amount of time
after announcement before forcing entry is governed by the general Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard, which turns on consideration of the
totality of the circumstances. 3 ' In the instant case, where the defendant was
suspected of distributing drugs and police officers sought to confiscate
cocaine through the search, fifteen to twenty seconds was a reasonable
period of time to wait before forcing entry.32
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS REVEALED: SAFEGUARDING
INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY

In assaying the rather recent legal history of the "knock and announce"
rule, one cannot help but wonder whether such ado is warranted. With life
and liberty hanging precariously in the balance, individual targets of a
nonconsensual home entry by police may understandably place secondary
value in whether officers knock at the door, announce their presence, and
wait precious few seconds before forcing their way in. Moreover, given the
relative ease with which officers can justify a "no-knock" entry under legal
precedents, one would be pardoned for characterizing the "knock and
announce" rule as mere constitutional window dressing.
In Richards v. Wisconsin, the Court acknowledged the apparent
insignificance of the "knock and announce" rule in light of other, more
well-known Fourth Amendment safeguards. At the same time, however,
the Court stressed the important Fourth Amendment interests at work in
the "knock and announce" rule:
While it is true that a no-knock entry is less intrusive than, for
example, a warrantless search, the individual interests implicated by

29.
30.
31.
32.

124 S. Ct. 521 (2003).
United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2002).
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 525.
Id. at 527.
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an unannounced, forcible entry should not be unduly minimized....
[T]he common law recognized that individuals should be provided
the opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction
of property occasioned by a forcible entry. These interests are not
*inconsequential.
Additionally, when police enter a residence without announcing
their presence, the residents are not given any opportunity to prepare
themselves for such an entry. . . . The brief interlude between
announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that
an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.33
The Court's digression in Richardsprovides insight into its view of the
"knock and announce" rule. The Court perceives the "knock and
announce" rule, at its core, as a safeguard on individual dignity. While a
"no-knock" entry is not the most pernicious sort of governmental privacy
intrusion, it strikes at the individual's sense of security. Of further concern
is the potential shame and fear resulting from an inability to prevent
outsiders from breaching the castle door. The "knock and announce" rule
recognizes the thoroughly distasteful effects of having unknown intruders
enter the home.
Concerns of protecting the private sphere from outsiders, especially a
powerful central government, were prominent in the Framers' minds. One
can see these fears at work in the Second Amendment's "right of the
people to keep and bear Arms,"3 the Third Amendment's restriction on
soldiers "quarter[ing] in any house, without the consent of the Owner,"35
and the Fourth Amendment.36 This is not surprising given the paramount

33. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
36. Commentators have pointed out that popular fear of a strong central government was the
central impetus for attaching the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Alex Glashausser,
Citation and Representation, 55 VAND. L. REV. 59, 103 (2002) ("Like the Establishment Clause,
much of the Bill of Rights stemmed from Americans' fear of a distant national government.");
Kevin J. Worthen, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Light of Thornton: The People and
EssentialAttributes of Sovereignty, 1998 BYU L. REV. 137, 144 ("The vast majority of modern
scholars agree that the central purpose of the Second Amendment was to assuage fears that the
increased powers vested in the newly created central government... would be used by ambitious
tyrants to assert despotic control over the people."). Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan,
BringingForwardthe Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, orPrecedent Stand in the
Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 830 (1997) (stating that the first eight amendments to the U.S.
Constitution "stemmed from a general fear that the national government was empowered by the
Constitution to invade well-established rights of importance to the people").
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role of classic liberalistic teachings to the nation's founding37 and
liberalism's philosophical focus on the individual and the individual's
inherent right to liberty and dignity.3" Indeed, the individual's natural right
to property and freedom of action within and with respect to property was
a key aspect of eighteenth-century Lockean liberalism.39 English - and
later American - common law readily absorbed liberalistic theory into
workable legal principles.' It is plain that the Fourth Amendment's
indefatigable guarding of the home is an outcropping of the liberalistic
tradition.
Thus, the "knock and announce" rule logically flows from this
liberalistic inheritance as a constitutional mechanism for tempering the
evils of governmental intrusion into the sacred home. At the same time the
"knock and announce" rule harkens to genteel notions of etiquette and
proper conduct by requiring that police officers properly call upon the
occupant of a home before breaching the castle door. In this vein, the
"knock and announce" rule accurately reflects the English social mores
from which it originated." It has been noted that the uninvited guest was

37.
ORIGINS

JAMES

R.

STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE

OF AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM

162-63

(1992) (stating that "American

constitutionalism is largely built of the same materials as" Blackstone's Commentaries, which
incorporated liberalism); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 206-14 (1969) (arguing that the Framers rejected the republican notion that the self
should be sacrificed for the common good and embraced liberalism); cf William Michael Treanor,
The OriginalUnderstandingof the Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess,95 COLuM. L. REV.
782, 823 (1995) (stating that there is "now a near consensus that both republican and liberal ideas
powerfully influenced American politics during the 1780s and 1790s").
38. See IAN SHAPIRo, THE EVOLUTIONOFRiGHTSINLIBERALTHEORY 277 (1986) (stating that
"the view of man's negative freedom, of a private sphere surrounding him that cannot be entered
(first by other individuals and eventually by the state) without his consent, became the standard

view of freedom in the liberal tradition");

FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES INPHILOSOPHY,

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 119-20 (1978) (stating that classic liberalism
carried a demand for freedom of the individual, and a respect for the individual personality).
39. See PIERRE MANENT, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF LIBERALISM 43-44 (Rebecca
Balinski trans., 1994) (stating that John Locke "solidly established" the individual's right to
property, and created an analysis under which "the individual has a natural right to a property that
has no natural limits.").
40. See STONER, supra note 37, at 163 (stating that William Blackstone's Commentaries
attempted to "reconcile not just in theory but in detail the principles of liberal political theory and
the practices of English common law"); Albert W. Alschuler, RediscoveringBlackstone,145 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 44-45 (discussing the influence of liberalism on Blackstone); Duncan Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 216-17 (noting that liberalism
became "a mode of legal thought" through Blackstone and others).
41. PENELOPE JOAN FRITZER, JANE AUSTEN AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COURTESY BOOKS

52 (1997) (stating that "one's conduct and conversation were of significant consequence" in Jane
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a particularly unpalatable imposition on English domesticity in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the formative time period for our
common-law inheritance.42 Thus, it seems rather fitting that the U.S.
Constitution, through the "knock and announce" rule, would contain a
means of ensuring that governmental authorities accord due respect to
domestic tranquility even in the case of suspected criminals.
Although from this perspective one might dismiss the "knock and
announce" rule as an antiquated formality, a vestige of our liberalistic
English heritage, to do so would ignore the important role of the "knock
and announce" rule in the Constitution's overarching protective scheme.
43
In essence, the "knock and announce" rule guards individual dignity.
More specifically, as the Court in Richards explained, the "knock and
announce" rule allows the target of a search at least two important
modicums of self-respect: 1) the opportunity to prevent damage to the
home and 2) a brief period of time to compose oneself and prepare for an
intrusion into the home.'
Of these interests, concern for the integrity of the castle door lies at the
core of the U.S. Supreme Court's "knock and announce" rule doctrine. The
Court in UnitedStates v. Ramirez,while authorizing dispensation with the
duty to announce under exigent circumstances, did caution that in theory,
"[e]xcessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a
search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is
lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression."45 The
Court thus suggested that Fourth Amendment protection of the castle door

Austen's time); MARJORIE MORGAN, MANNERS, MORALS AND CLASS IN ENGLAND, 1774-1858, at
91-95 (1994) (discussing etiquette as a means of social mobility in early Victorian England).
42. PAUL LANGFORD, ENGLISHNESS IDENTIFIED: MANNERS AND CHARACTER 1650-1850, at
119 (2000) ("The Englishman dined out by appointment and received formal company by
appointment, but could not tolerate ease of access to his home. He expect[ed] to be in enjoyment
of his drawing-room, without fear of interruption from uninvited guests .. ")(internal quotation
marks omitted).
43. Although not identified by the circuit court as a reason for the "knock and announce"
rule, there are important safety interests for both officers and the public supporting constitutionally
mandated announcement beyond the ephemeral notions of dignity. If officers announce their
presence before breaking through the door, the individuals inside the home are given an opportunity
to give themselves up. Also, individuals will not mistake officers for burglars and erroneously shoot
them. See United States v. Gallegos, 314 F.3d 456, 459 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that one of the
purposes of the "knock and announce" rule is to permit "individuals to comply with the law by
peaceably permitting officers to enter their homes"); United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d
432, 435 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the "knock and announce" rule's requirement of a reasonable
waiting period before forcing entry "protects citizens and law enforcement officers from violence").
44. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 n.5 (1997).
45. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998).
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extends beyond, or even from, criminal defense strategy and the
exclusionary rule.
The Court's doctrinal theme of reverence for the entryway continued in
United States v. Banks.46 There, the Court unequivocally identified
protection of the castle door as the paramount interest involved in the
"knock and announce" rule. Pointing to language from Semayne 's Case
stating that the law "abhors the destruction or breaking of any house.., by
which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party,"4' 7 the
Court stated that "[o]ne point in making an officer knock and announce,
then, is to give a person inside the chance to save his door."4 In applying
a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, the Court instructed "the
need to damage property in the course of getting in is a good reason to
require more patience than it would be reasonable to expect if the door
'
were open."49
Thus, at the heart of the lofty, genteel dignity interests undergirding the
"knock and announce" rule lies a strikingly prosaic concern: protecting the
castle door. Although protecting one's door seems rather trivial when
compared with the more weighty concerns generated by the prospects of
a confrontation with the police and potential governmental prosecution,
preserving one's door is by no means a minor concern. The door
symbolizes the integrity of the home and ensures that activities within it
remain private. At the same time, the door conveys power to the occupant
of a home; it is the means by which the occupant may exclude or include
others in activities occurring within. Furthermore, the door provides safety.
Whereas an open door allows unwanted others to penetrate the home for
whatever nefarious purposes they may harbor in their minds, a latched door
presents a physically and symbolically significant obstacle to intruders.
This interest is paramount in the present political climate where the
public's desire for security is at a premium.5 °

46. United States v. Banks, 124 S.Ct. 521 (2003).
47. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603).
48. Banks, 123 S. Ct. at 528.
49. Id.
50. It should be disclosed that I have a particular interest in the "knock and announce" rule.
During my adolescence, my family was the target of a "no-knock" entry. Waking up in the room
I shared with my brother, I remember being awoken by a thunderous booming sound and the
beeping of our house alarm. Every other time the house alarm was activated, one of my family
members was the culprit. Therefore, my mother instinctively deactivated the alarm from her room
and ran to the front door to see what had happened. My brother and I stayed in our beds, frozen.
I remember being paralyzed with fear, believing that a burglar had entered the home and hoping that
the intruder would leave without harming my family.
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IV. ENFORCING DIGNITY INTERESTS

The U.S. Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment case law makes clear
that the "knock and announce" rule is a significant constitutional principle.
Indeed, in its decisions the U.S. Supreme Court has eloquently expressed
the hallowed dignity interests furthered by the "knock and announce" rule
and instructed that the rule's importance "should not be ;unduly
minimized."'" One cannot help but recognize and be impressed by the
Court's almost innocent reverence for the castle door and its championing
of an occupant's opportunity to freely and independently grant entry to the
home.
Yet, upon closer examination the promise of the Court's "knock and
announce" rule doctrine rings hollow. Notwithstanding the Court's noble
"knock and announce" rule verbiage, the doctrine provides little with
respect to enforcement. In fact, in all of its Fourth Amendment "knock and
announce" rule decisions, from Wilson to Banks, the Supreme Court has
never ruled a forced police entry unreasonable.52 Unlike other Fourth
Amendment rights, such as the warrant requirement or the rule requiring
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop,53 the cases have not laid out a clear
method for enforcing violations of the "knock and announce" rule.54 If
anything, the Court has distanced the "knock and announce" rule from its
Fourth Amendment cousins. In effect, what has emerged is a mass of
constitutional surplusage with little muscle packed in its punch.

As it turned out, after receiving an emergency call for an ambulance from an elderly woman
who lived across the street, the police had gotten the address wrong. My parents were furious with
the police, shouting at the officers as they turned to leave. By the time I had mustered the courage
to join my parents at the threshold, a deep sense of vulnerability set in. As my family stood around
our now prostrate door, our thoughts turned to a more immediate concern: how to go about
replacing the door. This episode anecdotally affirms the Supreme Court's acknowledgment in Banks
that the opportunity to save the castle door afforded by the "knock and announce" rule and its
attendant dignity aspects is of no small import. See id.
51. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997).
52. See Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 523, 527; United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998);
Richards, 520 U.S. at 388; Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995).
53. In Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) the U.S. Supreme Court held that a police officer's
reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in criminal activity is enough to allow the officer to
stop the person for a brief time in order to investigate.
54. See Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 523, 527; Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71; Richards, 520 U.S. at 388;
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
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A. Enforcing the "Knock andAnnounce " Rule in the Criminaland Civil
Contexts: Our Toothless Tiger Grins
1. The Exclusionary Rule
One of the above quoted phrases from Ramirez is illustrative of the
enforcement gap in the U.S. Supreme Court's "knock and announce"
doctrine. The Court in Ramirez cautioned that "[e]xcessive or unnecessary
destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth
Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the
5 This caveat is significant. One
search are not subject to suppression.""
could reasonably interpret it to indicate that in a criminal case, so long as
the search is otherwise lawful - carried out pursuant to a valid search
warrant - excessive or unnecessary destruction of property through a
forced entry would not permit a defendant to successfully move to suppress
the fruits of the search. 6 It also intimates that the Court does not
necessarily link violations ofthe "knock and announce" rule with evidence
suppression.
There are solid doctrinal bases for believing that the Court would not
approve of applying the exclusionary rule to "knock and announce" rule
violations. The Court has carved out significant exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, which could preclude suppressing evidence obtained
following a "knock and announce" rule violation. For instance, the
"inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule provides that
evidence obtained through unlawful police conduct may be admitted at
trial "[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered
by lawful means." 7 "Circumstances justifying application of the
'inevitable discovery' rule are most likely to be present if these
investigative procedures were already in progress prior to the discovery via
illegal means ...""
In the case of a "knock and announce" rule violation assuming there is
no other constitutional complication in the search, it is logical to surmise
that the "inevitable discovery" exception would be implicated since
evidence seized in the home would more than likely have been properly
discovered had the violation not occurred. Unlike an unlawful search of
property (e.g., officers opening a car trunk without probable cause or
55. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
56. See id.
57. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984).
58. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4(a), at 249 (3d ed. 1996).
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reasonable suspicion and uncovering contraband), or an illegal seizure of
a defendant (e.g., officers detaining an individual solely on the basis of her
race and discovering contraband in her wallet), a "knock and announce"
rule violation will rarely be a necessary predicate to the discovery of
incriminating evidence. A "knock and announce" rule violation will
normally occur once "investigative procedures [are] already in progress"
and when probable cause sufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant
is present.59 This is a situation ripe for application of the "inevitable
discovery" exception.
Furthermore, the Court has generally stated that evidence should not be
suppressed if suppression would do little to further the purposes of the
exclusionary rule. Additionally, the Court has been reluctant in recent cases
to expand the scope of the exclusionary rule. In Brown v. Illinois6" Justice
Powell pointed out that the Court "recognizes that in some circumstances
strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes
greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be
justified by the rule's deterrent purposes."6 ' Based on this view, lower
courts have developed an amorphous attenuated basis/connection
exception, similar to proximate causation in tort law. 62 Under the costbenefit balancing approach of the attenuated basis/connection exception to
the exclusionary rule, the Court would be loath to exclude otherwise
admissible evidence from trial based merely on a technical violation of the
"knock and announce" rule. Doing so would provide little benefit in terms
of coercing officers to respect the minimal requirements imposed by the
"knock and announce" rule, yet impose significant societal costs by
allowing a criminal act to go unpunished.63
59. See id.
60. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
concurring).
61. Id. at 608-09 (Powell, J.,
62. E.g., United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 779 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Under the
'attenuated connection doctrine,' the challenged evidence is admissible if the causal connection
between the constitutional violation and the discovery of the evidence is so attenuated as to rid the
taint."); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the attenuated
basis exception applies when the "relationship between the unlawful search or seizure and the
challenged evidence becomes sufficiently weak to dissipate any taint resulting from the original
illegality"); see also LAFAVE, supranote 58, at 235 ("[T]he underlying purpose of the 'attenuated

connection' test is to mark 'the point ofdiminishing returns of the deterrence principle."') (quoting
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, andSection 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
390 (1964)).
63. See Loly Garcia Tor, Note, Mandating Exclusion for Violations of the Knock and
Announce Rule, 83 B.U. L. REV. 853, 871-73 (2003) (discussing similar government arguments for

not applying the exclusionary rule to "knock and announce" rule violations based on
disproportionateness of sanction compared to constitutional harm).
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In this sense, a "knock and announce" rule violation is similar to the
unconstitutional use of excessive force in that its harms are generally
divorced from any subsequent criminal prosecution. In the civil rights
context, the lower courts have held that an excessive force violation is
sufficiently distinct from any corollary criminal proceedings to allow for
consideration of the excessive force claim apart from the outcome of the
criminal prosecution.' Similarly, because a Fourth Amendment excessive
force violation occurs during an investigation and does not normally
generate evidence, courts have held the exclusionary rule's purposes would
not be furthered if applied based solely on officers' use of excessive
force.65
This principle is also seen with a "knock and announce" rule violation.
An unannounced forced entry into a home will rarely itself result in the
production of relevant evidence. Any evidence seized through the
subsequent search of the home would have been discovered regardless of
whether officers properly announced their presence and presented the
warrant for inspection. Hence, it would run counter to the purposes
underlying the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence based merely on a
"knock and announce" rule violation.
Lower courts disagree as to whether a "knock and announce" rule
violation is a sufficient basis for suppressing evidence under the
exclusionary rule. Of the post-Wilson cases to address the issue, the
Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Langford that exclusion of
evidence is an improper remedy for a violation of the "knock and
announce" rule.66 Judge Posner, writing for the Court, applied the
"inevitable discovery" exception, and opined that "it is hard to understand
how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but

64. See, e.g., Robinson v. Doe, 272 F.3d 921,923 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A] claim of excessive
force in making an arrest does not require overturning the plaintiff's conviction even though the
conviction was based in part on a determination that the arrest itself was lawful."); Jackson v.
Suffolk County Homicide Bureau, 135 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that an excessive force
civil claim does not necessarily implicate the validity of a related criminal conviction); Nelson v.
Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (same as to a related criminal conviction for resisting
arrest).
65. See State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44, 51-52 (Alaska 1980) (holding that the exclusionary
rule is not triggered by excessive force violations since suppressing evidence would not have a
sufficient deterrent effect and other remedies were available).
66. E.g., United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 895 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that "there
is no logic to using [the "knock and announce" rule] to exclude evidence obtained by a search");
United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, 728 (7th Cir. 2001).
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'inevitable' once the police arrive with a warrant."67 The "knock and
announce" rule, the Court continued, "is not a rule that, like the Fourth
Amendment itself, is intended to provide a privilege to withhold evidence.
Therefore, there is no logic to using it to exclude evidence obtained by a
search."6 8 Other post-Wilson cases have held that evidence may be
suppressed based on a violation of the "knock and announce" rule, largely
because the "knock and announce" rule would be "emasculated" if it could
not be enforced.69 Certainly this latter point is persuasive. However, in
light-of Ramirez's caveat, the "inevitable discovery" exception to the
exclusionary rule, and the Court's balancing approach to application of the
exclusionary rule, the emasculation rationale may prove too little to carry
the day before the Court. Moreover, the Court's recent trend has been
toward narrowing the scope of the exclusionary rule,7 ° and there is no
reason to think the "knock and announce" rule would cause the Court to
shift direction.
2. Civil Rights Actions
Those able to avoid criminal prosecution and seek civil relief may take
greater comfort in Ramirez's concern for property destruction, but such
198371
comfort should be tempered. A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §
72
or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents may be a more effective
mechanism for enforcing violations of the "knock and announce" rule for
both defendants and bystanders.73 In many jurisdictions, however,
prospective civil complainants must first defeat any criminal charges or
convictions entered against them as a prerequisite to filing a civil rights
action. In Heck v. Humphrey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that to recover

67. Langford, 314 F.3d at 894 (quoting United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th
Cir. 1998)).
68. Id.at 895.
69. E.g., United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Moore,
91 F.3d 96, 99 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also Recent Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 709, 716 (2001)
(criticizing the Seventh Circuit's approach and stating that "police misconduct will not be deterred
if courts are unwilling to punish the police when the evidence is 'too good to lose"').
70. E.g., United States v. Patane, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004) (holding that violation of
Mirandarule does not warrant suppression of physical evidence obtained through suspect's tainted
statements).
71. Section 1983 provides that any state actor who causes a "deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured."
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
72. 403 U.S. 388, 394-95, 397 (1971) (providing a private right of action against federal
officials for deprivations of civil rights).
73. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1(k) (2d ed. 1999).
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civil damages for a constitutional deprivation linked to a criminal
conviction or prosecution, a claimant's charges or conviction must be
"reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."74 Based
on Heck, appellate courts have held that any civil rights action for illegal
search and seizure of evidence upon which criminal charges are based
cannot be maintained unless the criminal charges have first been dismissed
or the conviction overturned.75 Others, though disagreed with such a
sweeping application of Heck and held Heck does not bar such suits.76 Of
course, in a jurisdiction adopting the former position, the corollary might
be that the "knock and announce" rule violation is sufficiently tied to the
related criminal prosecution to permit application of the exclusionary
rule.7 7 This might offer some consolation.
Even if a claimant is able to overcome Heck's procedural hurdle, setting
forth a valid claim for relief based on a "knock and announce" rule
violation may yet prove elusive. The U.S. Supreme Court has greatly
circumscribed the breadth of the "knock and announce" rule's protections.
Under Richards, if officers are able to establish exigent circumstances that is, a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence
would create danger, jeopardize evidence, or even be futile - a "no
knock" entry will be justified.78 While the exigency requirement is not
entirely pro forma,7 9 few experienced officers will encounter difficulty
rationalizing a "no-knock" search,8 ° especially where there are indications

74. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
75. E.g., Harveyv. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015(9th Cir. 2000); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan,
182 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1999); Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1995).
76. E.g., Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 559 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999);
Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646,648 (7th Cir. 1998); Simmons v. O'Brien, 77 F.3d 1093,
1095 (8th Cir. 1996); Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253 n.1 (11 th Cir. 1995).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 51-63.
78. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
79. For instance, courts have held that the mere presence of firearms in a home does not
permit officers to forego compliance with the "knock and announce" rule. E.g., United States v.
Bynum, 362 F.3d 574, 581-82 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96, 98 (10th Cir.
1996) ("The mere statement that firearms are present, standing alone, is insufficient."); United
States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The reasonable belief that firearms mayhave
been within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient."); cf United States v. Stowe, 100
F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Guns and drugs together distinguish the millions of homes where
guns are present from those housing potentially dangerous drug dealers - an important narrowing
factor.").
80. Various commentators have discussed the prevalence ofpolice officers adroitly describing
or worse, manipulating - facts in order to justify a search. E.g., Christopher Slobogin,

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 16

that the target is potentially dangerous or able to swiftly destroy relevant
evidence. 8 Moreover, a judge or magistrate need not approve exigent
circumstances beforehand, but exigencies may contemporaneously develop
at the scene of the search.82 Because officers execute a search warrant by
entering unfamiliar ground in search of criminal activity, evidence, and
suspects, a court will unlikely restrictively apply Richard's exigency
requirement after the fact.
Furthermore, even where there is no existing exigency before the fact
an exigency may develop after officers knock.8 3 In Banks, the Court held
that officers announcing their presence and intent to execute a valid search
warrant may construe silence as a refusal to admit.84 Thus, once officers
knock and announce their presence, the Court explained, the length of time

Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do about It, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1996)
("[L]ying intended to convict the guilty - in particular, lying to evade the consequences of the
exclusionary rule - is so common and so accepted in some jurisdictions that the police themselves
have come up with a name for it: 'testilying."'); Morgan Cloud, The DirtyLittle Secret, 43 EMoRY
L.J. 1311, 1321, 1321-24 (1994) (stating that "experienced officers know that no matter what they
do, judges often will look the other way, or bend over backwards to approve the officers' testimony
and to avoid suppressing evidence," and outlining reasons judges rarely grant motions to suppress
based on police perjury); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,Perjury,and the HeaterFactor:An
ExclusionaryRule in the Chicago CriminalCourts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 83 (1992) (reporting
results of survey in which "[r]espondents, including prosecutors, estimate[d] that police commit
perjury between 20% and 50% of the time they testify on Fourth Amendment issues").
Whether or not this practice is widespread is subject to dispute. See D. Lowell Jensen &
Rosemary Hart, The Good Faith Restatement of the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 916, 935 (1982) (stating that association ofpolice perjury to searches is "completely
unfounded" and is "unfair, a gratuitous slur upon the integrity of police").
Without entering the fray, it is worth mentioning that with the bar to establishing exigency
having been set so low byRichards, officers would encounter little difficulty exaggerating their way
into a valid "no-knock" search.
81. United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521, 527 (2003) (stating that "the opportunity to get
rid of cocaine" is highly relevant to the determination of whether officers' forced entry was
reasonable under the circumstances).
82. E.g., United States v. Peterson, 353 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that "noknock" entry was justified since two of the three Richardsfactors presented themselves at the scene
when the suspect opened the door, spotted the officers, and closed the door); United States v.
Cooper, 168 F.3d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1999) (ratifying "no knock" entry based on knowledge
acquired by officers at the scene).
83. "In fact, an actual physical knock may not even be necessary in effecting a constitutional
"knock and announce." See United States v. Combs, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 400 (9th Cir. 2005)
stating that although "[t]he general practice of physically knocking at the door and announcing law
enforcement's presence and purpose, and receiving an actual refusal or waiting a sufficient amount
of time to infer refusal is the preferred method of entry," an actual physical knock is not necessary
in complying with the constitutional "knock and announce" rule).
84. Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 527.
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officers wait at the door for a response can create an exigency justifying
forced entry." At least where cocaine is at issue, fifteen to twenty seconds
is a reasonable interlude between announcement and forced entry. 6
"Absent exigency," the Court qualified, "the police must knock and receive
actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to infer one."8 7
The Court in Banks cautioned that, in determining the degree of
patience officers are reasonably expected to expend, a court should
consider the need to damage property and the type of evidence sought:
Suffice it to say that the need to damage property in the course of
getting in is a good reason to require more patience than it would be
reasonable to expect if the door were open. Police seeking a stolen
piano may be able to spend more time to make sure they really need
the battering ram. 8
In most instances, however, an exigency will swiftly develop after officers
announce their presence. For example, where officers seek to search a
home for evidence that can be easily destroyed or tampered with, such as
narcotics or firearms, or where officers fear for the safety of a person in the
home, a court applying Banks would likely rule a brief waiting period is
sufficient to create an exigency justifying forced entry. 9
Finally, although the Court has held out the possibility that "[e]xcessive
or unnecessary destruction ofproperty in the course of a search may violate
the Fourth Amendment," 90 it is hard to imagine that this phrase will lead
to relief in any but the most egregious sorts of "knock and announce"
violations. For a court to find property destruction "excessive or
unnecessary" even when the officers' entry was otherwise lawful, mere

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 529.
88. Id. at 528.
89. E.g., United States v. Combs, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 400 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
officers did not violate the "knock and announce" rule by forcing entry after announcing their
presence over a loud speaker where the home "was equipped with security cameras and floodlights,
[w]indows were papered over," and the investigation involved methamphetamine production);
United States v. Bennett, 368 F.3d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that officers investigating
a drug offense acted reasonably in breaking down the suspect's door after knocking and seeing
movement in the home given the "close relationship between guns and drug trafficking"); United
States v. Pinson, 321 F.3d 558, 566-68 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that officers did not violate the
"knock and announce" rule in breaking down the door a few seconds after an announcement since
the search was conducted during daytime and the offense involved narcotics).
90. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998).
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damage to an entryway, i.e., a door or window, would likely not suffice.
Such damage is logically "necessary" to execute a legal forced entry.9
No doubt, a home occupant who has suffered a forced entry will find
setting forth a viable claim for relief based on a "knock and announce" rule
violation to be an onerous enterprise.92
B. An Illustration:the "Knock and Announce" Rule from the
Immigrant'sPerspective
The immigrant's perspective lucidly illustrates the enforcement
problems latent in the "knock and announce" doctrine. For many
immigrants language barriers present a significant obstacle to
understanding the officer's announcement.93 Given linguistic barriers, one
might ask: does the "knock and announce" rule afford a non-English
speaker the same opportunity to save her door that is bestowed upon an
English speaker? At first blush, this may seem a rather inconsequential
nuance. However, this inquiry becomes far more significant when
considered against the backdrop of evolving American demographics,
which are moving toward increased numbers of foreign-born residents, and
the increasing militarization of police tactics. With substantial numbers of
migrants flowing into the United States from Mexico, China, Central
American and other non-English speaking countries,9 4 it becomes
statistically more likely that some members of these groups will experience
police contact. Many of these foreign-born residents lack proficiency in
English.95 At the same time, the substantial amounts of money and risk

91. Cf id. at 68 (rejecting a rule requiring that officers be held to a standard higher than
"reasonable suspicion" when making "no-knock" entries that result in the destruction of property).
92. Interestingly, Judge Posner, in writing that the exclusionary rule does not apply to "knock
and announce" rule violations, suggested that section 1983 actions are sufficient alternative means
of deterring such violations. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2002).
93. This illustration might hold for others unable to understand communications in English,
such as the hearing impaired.
94. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH

2002, at 1-2 (Feb. 2003) (stating that of the 32.5 million foreign-born in the United States in 2002,
36.4% were from Mexico and Central America, and 25.5% were from Asia); STEVEN A.
2000: A
SNAPSHOT OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 1 (2001) (stating that the number of

CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES -

immigrants in the United States has more than tripled since 1970), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2001/back 01 .html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
95. See, e.g., David Pierson, NewLawAims to ProtectAsians, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2004, sec.
B (stating more than 12 million Californians primarily speak a language other than English, with
approximately 8.1 million speaking Spanish and 1.8 million speaking one of four major Asian
languages).
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surrounding drug trafficking have given rise to more sophisticated and
lethal criminals. 96 Building on fears of organized drug cartels, police
departments have, in turn, developed more advanced, military-like methods
of executing search warrants.97 It is not uncommon for officers to perform
a search in the darkness of night, wearing unmarked or poorly marked
clothing, with guns drawn. 98 Certainly, then, the issue of how language
impacts Fourth Amendment "knock and announce" procedures merits
attention.
In approaching enforcement from the immigrant's perspective, the
foremost inquiry is whether the Fourth Amendment accommodates an
immigrant at all. The answer here is almost certainly "yes." It would seem
logical, based on the rationale articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
support of the "knock and announce" rule, that if officers know the
occupant of a home speaks only a particular language they must announce
their presence and demand entry into the home in a manner that the
occupant can understand.

96. Illegal drug trafficking is used as an example because it constitutes the largest basis for
criminal convictions in the United States. See Douglas B. Marlowe, Effective Strategies For
Intervening With Drug Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REv. 989, 993 (2002) ("Indeed, the lion's
share of the growth in the U.S. inmate population, which has increased roughly three-fold since the
early 1980s, is attributable to drug law violators." (footnotes omitted)); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial
Fact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1167
(2001) ("Drug defendants make up the largest class of federal criminals, amounting to more than
a third of federal defendants and more than half of all federal inmates.").
The prevalence of drug convictions has particular meaning for immigrants. See U.S. Sentencing
Commission Hearing, Statement of Charles Kamasaki, 14 Fed. Sent. R. 204, at 9 (Feb. 25, 2002)
(stating that "nearly three-quarters of Latino federal prison inmates are incarcerated for drug
offenses, by far the largest proportion of any group").
97. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the
"War on Drugs" Was a "War on Blacks," 6 J.GENDER RACE & JUST. 381,405 (2002) (stating that
"SWAT units have provided a conduit for the transfer of military techniques and materials into the
hands of ordinary police departments," and more than 90% of cities with populations over 50,000
have SWAT teams); David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The
Waco Disasterand the MilitarizationofAmerican Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 619, 651
(1997) (stating that "[t]he federal government actively works to militarize local law enforcement").
98. In one recent "no-knock" search trial ending in a verdict for the plaintiffs, officers, in
executing a search of the home of a suspected cocaine dealer with no prior criminal convictions,
wore unmarked, "ninja-style" black outfits and masks and tossed a "flash-bang" device into the
home which set off a blinding flash and loud noise before they shoot the occupant. Maryclaire Dale,
Associated Press, "No Knock" Death Sparks Lawsuit (Sept. 25, 2003), availableat http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/25/national/main575007.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2004); Elliot
Grossman, Jury to Judge Police Role in Deadly Raid, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Sept. 6,
2003, at Al. The "flash-bang" device caused a fire that burned down the home and prevented
officers from saving the occupant. Id.
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In Wilson, the Court noted that the "knock and announce" rule is
"justified in part by the belief that announcement generally would avoid
'the destruction or breaking of any house.., by which great damage and
inconvenience might ensue."' 99 Furthermore, in Richards, the Court
highlighted the dual interests underlying the "knock and announce" rule:
avoiding destruction of property and allowing the occupants of the home
a brief moment to prepare themselves for a lawful home invasion."0 The
justification for the "knock and announce" rule set forth in Wilson and the
interests identified in Richards would be frustrated if the occupant of a
home did not understand the content of the announcement. A home
occupant certainly cannot save her door or prepare for officers to enter her
home if she does not comprehend the demands for entry of the strangers
outside her door.' Surely courts would not find an occupant unreasonable
for refusing to open her home to unidentified callers merely because they
shout authoritatively at her door.
At the same time, officers cannot be expected to announce their
presence and intent to search the home in every conceivable language or
dialect that the occupants of the home might speak. Such a requirement
would be far more burdensome than the Court contemplated in
promulgating the "knock and announce" rule especially given the many
multicultural, immigrant-rich population centers in the United States.
Therefore, only where officers know or should know the occupant of a
home understands only a particular non-English language would it be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to expect officers to "knock and
announce" their presence in that language. 0 2
Such a rule would strike the proper balance between allowing officers
to efficiently and effectively enforce the law and protecting the rights of
the individual under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court
stated in Wilson: "The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of
reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement
that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests."'0 3 In fact, it appears

99. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,935-36 (1995) (quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
194, 196 (K.B. 1603)).
100. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997).
101. One might note that an immigrant will generally need little time to learn the meaning of
the word "police." Comprehension of the other words and phrases that could be uttered during
execution of a warrant (e.g., warrant, arrest, search), however, might not be as forthcoming.
102. Of course, ifthe target of the search is known to speak only a particular language in which
officers have no reasonable means of communicating, it is unlikely that a court would penalize them
for using some other means, such as signs, of communicating their presence.
103. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. The notion that the privacy rights of individuals must be
balanced against the needs of law enforcement is a common theme in Fourth Amendment law. Cf
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that some law enforcement organizations, perhaps anticipating such a
requirement, are already using non-English announcements where there is
reason to believe the occupant of a home does not understand English.104
What happens, then, if officers "knock and announce" their presence,
the occupant of the home does not understand the announcement, and
officers have no reason to know the home occupant does not understand
their announcement? Here we arrive at the gray area of the "knock and
announce" rule's protection of the castle door. As discussed above, if
officers do not know or do not have reason to know the occupant of the
home to be searched does not understand English, it would be
unreasonable to impose on them the burden of announcing their presence
in a panoply of other languages solely because it is possible the home
occupant does not comprehend English. Thus, under such circumstances
and absent other relevant factors - e.g., ability to show a badge though a
window - the officers' English-language announcement would be
constitutionally adequate.
In this hypothetical, once officers make their announcement in English,
the unwitting immigrant must act quickly. Under Banks, a home occupant
who does not know the identity of those demanding entry into her home
will generally have precious few seconds to determine whether to open the
door. °5 This places the immigrant in the position of having to choose
between opening the door to a group of armed strangers and accepting the
attendant security risks that come with that decision, or erring on the side
of caution by leaving the door in place and, consequently, sacrificing the
door. Of course, unless the home occupant is versed in constitutional
"knock and announce" law, she will not know she is incurring any risk at
all by leaving the door in place. The resulting decision thus becomes

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that there is a
"balance struck by the Fourth Amendment between the public interest in effective law enforcement
and the public interest in safeguarding individual freedom and privacy from arbitrary governmental
interference"); Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 850 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Through the years of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, courts have attempted to strike a delicate balance between the needs of
law enforcement officers who constantly place themselves in harm's way, and the sacred [Fourth
Amendment] rights [of the individual]."); United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677, 681 (7th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment ... necessarily recognizes that a balance must be maintained
between the needs of law enforcement and the right to privacy.").
104. E.g., Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that
officers announced their presence in both English and Spanish); United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d
64, 68 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that officers announced in English and Spanish, "police, open up");
United States v. 116 Emerson Street, 942 F.2d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that drug enforcement
agents announced their presence both in English and Spanish).
105. See United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521, 523 (2003).
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predictable. Even so, under Richards's exigency exception to the "knock
and announce" rule such an individual would be lucky to receive a knock
and an announcement in the first place. 106 Therefore, under the situation
described, the immigrant will eventually learn that it is likely officers
would not be acting unreasonably in laying waste to her door.
C. Recovering the Destroyed Door
However banal this section's inquiry might appear, anyone who has
experienced a forced police entry will not dismiss the question of what to
do about the destroyed door. In light of the constitutional significance
attached to the castle door, one is justified in expecting legal compensation
following destruction of the entryway notwithstanding the results of the
search. However, such an expectation is misplaced. Assuming one is
fortunate enough to suffer only destruction of the door after officers force
entry - as opposed to being shot at, arrested, or prosecuted - where
forced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it is unlikely that
courts will provide relief for a destroyed door. This conclusion is best
explained by exploring some of the more plausible, though ultimately
fruitless, available legal claims.
The most plausible federal avenue for civil relief from the unlawful
activities of police officers is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, a prerequisite
to recovery under section 1983 is deprivation of a constitutional right. °7
If officers can establish a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence would have created danger, jeopardized
evidence, or been futile, under Richards, the occupants of a home will not
be able to claim deprivation of a constitutional right due to the officers'
forced entry.0 8 Similarly, if officers knock and announce their presence
only to be ignored by the home occupant, under Banks, an exigency
justifying forced entry will swiftly develop so long as potentially
inculpatory evidence can be easily destroyed or lives are in danger.0 9 The
silent occupant will find no legal recourse for her destroyed door in section
1983.
106. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387-88 (1997).
107. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829 (1985) (stating that one of the
elements of a section 1983 action "involves the question of whether there has been a violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States"); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155
(1978) (stating that in order to state a claim under section 1983, plaintiffs "are first bound to show
that they have been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and the laws' of the United
States").
108. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 387-88.
109. See Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 523.
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Moreover, a person whose door is destroyed by forced entry will
similarly be frustrated in seeking legal recourse through state tort law.
Using California law as an example, under a negligence theory, a court will
not find liability unless officers have violated a duty owed to the
plaintiff." ° Breach of duty involves a reasonableness inquiry congruent
with Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis."' Hence, officers will
not be found to have violated a duty to the occupant of the home under
state law once their actions are deemed reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 1 2 Furthermore, invasion of property torts such as trespass
and conversion offer no relief since, under these torts, officers' actions are
privileged where they act out of necessity, i.e., exigency." 3 All of this can
be said without delving into the various governmental tort immunity
schemes the States have established for themselves." 4
Therefore, absent the unlikely happenstance that a court will find an
officer's forced entry unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a person
whose entryway has been destroyed during forced entry will likely have no
legal means of forcing compensation from state agencies for her felled
castle door. While the U.S. Supreme Court in Ramirez sustained the
possibility that excessive destruction of property may violate the Fourth
Amendment," 5 on the whole it is hard to imagine that a court will find
destruction of the door following a knock and announcement excessive. As
is often true in other circumstances, in many cases moral and political
motivations may prove to be more effective than the legal process in
obtaining compensation." 6

110. E.g., Artiglio v. Coming Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Cal. 1998) (listing "the well-known
elements of any negligence cause of action, viz., duty, breach of duty, proximate cause and
damages").
111. E.g., City of Simi Valley v. Super. Ct., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating
that state law negligence-based causes of action are not viable once defendants' actions have been
determined to be objectively reasonable under federal law).
112. Seeid.
113. See People v. Roberts, 303 P.2d 721,723 (Cal. 1956) ("Necessity often justifies an action
which would otherwise constitute a trespass, as where the act is prompted by the motive of
preserving life or property and reasonably appears to the actor to be necessary for that purpose.").
114. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810 (West 2004) (California Tort Claims Act); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 59:1-2 (West 2004) (New Jersey Tort Claims Act); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.4 (Michie 2004)
(Virginia Tort Claims Act).
115. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998).
116. Coming back to my personal anecdote, I should note that the police department was kind
enough to provide my family with nominal compensation.
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V. CONCLUSION

Through its jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has revealed that
individual dignity interests are the focus of the constitutional "knock and
announce" rule. Specifically, the "knock and announce" rule affords a
home occupant the opportunity to save the castle door, compose oneself,
and prepare for police officers to enter the home. Of these dignity interests,
the Court's chief concern has been on the more tangible one, saving the
castle door. Based on the Court's rhetoric, it appears that a key purpose of
the "knock and announce" rule is to avoid unnecessary destruction of
property regardless of the legality of an arrest or seizure of evidence
following police entry.
This Article addressed the enforcement problems surrounding the
"knock and announce" rule. As suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court" 7
and held by the Seventh Circuit," 8 it is dubious that a "knock and
announce" violation will serve as a basis for suppressing otherwise legally
seized evidence. Furthermore, a host of legal obstacles and exceptions to
the "knock and announce" rule will trip up all but the most robust claims
for civil relief. As seen through the lens of the non-English speaking
immigrant, the kinks in the armor become more apparent. Assuming
officers act reasonably in not announcing their presence in the language of
the home occupant, the door, if not more, will most certainly be sacrificed.
Finally, a home occupant whose entryway has been destroyed by police
executing a valid search warrant has little hope of attaining legal
compensation for the felled door under either federal or state law. Hence,
the "knock and announce" rule provides a noble yet largely unenforceable
right. Accordingly, we see that while the "knock and announce" rule's
toothless tiger pines passionately over the sacred castle door, it sits coyly
when enforcement issues arise.

117. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
118. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 895 (7th Cir. 2002).

